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test and direct more verdicts so as to substantially lighten the trial case load
will only be answered by the acceptance and application of the new rule at
the trial level. Even if the Pedrick rule is applied, the time saving factor is
still questionable, as the time necessary to pick a jury and present the evidence have not been alleviated. The prospect of less people filing frivolous
claims because they know the court will dismiss any claim not having substantial merit is also questionable, for if the person's claim is frivolous he
has nothing to lose by filing suit and hoping for a settlement before the
judge has a chance to dismiss.
In conclusion, the possible practical benefits of the rule in Pedrick concerning directed verdicts are outweighed by the susceptibility to encroachments
on our right to a trial by jury. While the actual worth of a jury is a question
men may debate, it is not a court's function to pass upon this question, but
rather the people's choice via amendment to their state constitution. The
long range effects of Pedrick, while seemingly harmless in the facts of the
case itself, are best summarized by Judge Dempsey in Mesich v. Austin
where he stated:
[B]ut we believe the time necessary to complete the case would have been a
small price to pay for following the law .

.

. there is a temptation in a case such

as this, where the evidence weighs heavily in one party's favor, to cut through the
restraints imposed by those fundamental principles which protect the right of the
opposite party to have a jury pass on his case. .

.

. Although it may appear desir-

able in a particular case to relax the time honored and hundreds-of-times confirmed
principles it cannot be done without undermining them ....

For a reviewing court

to relax the long settled standards of proof in a hard case would encourage further
relaxation; it would be an invitation to trial judges to weigh evidence and deter88
mine credibility.
Robert Tarnoff
83 Supra note 12 at 343-44, 217 N.E.2d at 547, 578.

NEGLIGENCE-MEDICAL MALPRACTICETHE LOCALITY RULE
On October 4, 1958, at St. Luke's Hospital in New Bedford, Massachusetts,
Mrs. Theresa Brune gave birth to a baby. During the delivery, an anesthesiologist administered a spinal anesthetic to Mrs. Brune containing eight
milligrams of Pontocaine. 1 Eleven hours later, attempting to get out of
bed, she slipped and fell on the floor. She subsequently complained of numb1 Trademark for preparations of tetracaine. The term tetracaine applies to a preparaDOJ.AND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL, DICTIONARY 1564 (24th

tion used as a local anesthetic.
ed. 1965).
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ness and weakness in her left leg, and brought suit against the doctor to
recover because of his alleged negligence in administering the spinal anesthetic. During the course of trial it was proved that the dosage of eight
milligrams of Pontocaine was excessive, and that good medical practice
required a dosage of five milligrams or less. It was also shown, however, that
in New Bedford the dosage administered was customary. The court instructed
the jury that the defendant:
[M]ust measure up to the standard of professional care and skill ordinarily possessed by others in his profession in the community, which is New Bedford, and
its environs, where he practices, having regard to the current state of advance of
the profession. If, in a given case, it were determined by a jury that the ability
and skill of the physician in New Bedford were fifty per cent inferior to that
which existed in Boston, a defendant in New Bedford would be required to measure
up to the standard of skill and competence and ability that is ordinarily found by
physicians in New Bedford. 2
Upon a verdict for the defendant, the court entered judgment accordingly.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts the plaintiff argued that
the defendant should be held to the standard of skill and care commonly
possessed and used by similar specialists in like circumstances; not merely
the standard of anesthesiologists practicing in New Bedford. The supreme
court reversed the lower court, and, in doing so, abandoned the "locality"
rule. Brune v. Belinkoff, - Mass.-, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
The Brune decision represents an important change in Massachusetts law.
The courts of that state had faithfully adhered to the "locality" rule since
the year 1880, when Small v. Howard3 was decided. In that case, the
defendant, a general practitioner in a country town with a population of 2,500,
was consulted by the plaintiff to treat a severe wound which required a
considerable degree of surgical skill. In an action against the defendant
for malpractice, ihe court limited the area in which to determine the skill
required to that prevailing in similar localities. The court felt that the doctor
in the small country village would not usually make a specialty of surgery.
He would perform very few, if any, surgical operations, and thus his exposure
to this type of work would be minimal. Hence he was not to be held to
the standard of skill possessed by those in large cities where surgery was
more prevalent. The court held him responsible only to the standard of those
4
in the same or similar localities.
2 Brune v. Belinkoff, - Mass. -, 235 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1968).
3

128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).

4 Id. at 136, 35 Am. Rep. at 364, 365. Subsequent decisions which followed the standard

applied by the Small court were: Delaney v. Rosenthall, 347 Mass. 143, 196 N.E.2d
878 (1964); Riggs v. Christie, 342 Mass. 402, 173 N.E.2d 610 (1961); Ramsland v.
Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960); Berardi v. Menicks, 340 Mass. 396, 164
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In counterpoint, the court in Brune felt the reason for interring the rule
was the change in the environment of the "small-town doctor."
We are of the opinion that the "locality" rule of Small v. Howard which measures
a physician's conduct by the Standards of other doctors in similar communities
is unsuited to present day conditions. The time has come when the medical profession should no longer be Balkanized by the application of varying geographic
standards in malpractice cases. Accordingly, Small v. Howard is hereby overruled. . . . The proper standard is whether the physician, if a general practitioner,
has exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner,
taking into account the advances in the profession. In applying this standard it
is permissible to consider the medical resources available to the physician as one
circumstance in determining the skill and care required. Under this standard
some allowance is thus made for the type of community in which the physician
carries on his practice. 5

This case note will examine the "locality" rule as it was first formulated,
the manner in which different courts have treated it, and the continuing
trend towards its abandonment.
While there have been numerous verbal formulations used to set up the
standard of care required of a doctor in the practice of medicine, the following have been found to be the basic elements of the prevailing rule:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

a reasonable or ordinary degree of skill and learning
commonly possessed and exercised by members of the profession
who are of the same school or system as the defendant
and who practice in the same or similar localities
and an exercise of the defendant's good judgment. 6

The fourth element, the "locality" rule, began to appear in various decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 7 The reasoning espoused
by the courts in applying this provincial doctrine bore striking similarity.
It was held that a country doctor, was, at most, a "country doctor." As such,
he did not possess the medical expertise found among his brethren practicing
N.E.2d 544 (1960); Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N.E.2d 185
(1938); Bouffard v. Canby, 292 Mass. 305, 198 N.E. 253 (1935); Ernen v. Crofwell, 272
Mass. 172, 172 N.E. 73 (1930).

5Supra note 2, at -, 235 N.E.2d at 798.
6
A. H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549,
559 (1959). Another source which is in accord as to the standard determinative of the
care required is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 299A, at 73 (1965). (As adopted and
promulgated by the American Law Institute at Washington, D. C.). "Unless he represents
that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in
the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities."
7 Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 33 (1870); Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 11 Am. Rep.
141 (1872); Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877).
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in the larger cities where the latest advances in medical facilities and medical
knowledge prevailed. Due to a lack of efficient transportation and communication, the country doctor was not kept aware of significant changes
in his profession. He did not possess the most advanced and sophisticated
equipment. He was, so to speak, limited by his environment.
Times and conditions have changed markedly from what they were when
the "locality" rule first was enunciated. Yet this rule has stubbornly stayed
with us. The first significant attempt to modify it nearly resulted in its
abandonment. In 1916, in the case of Viita v. Fleming,8 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held that a doctor was not to be held merely to the "same or
similar" locality standard.
We think it is plainly correct that the locality in which the physician or surgeon
practices must be considered in determining whether he has the requisite skill and
learning, but we do not think that he is bound to possess and exercise only that
degree of skill and learning possessed by other practitioners in the same locality,
if by that is meant the same village or city. If the same general locality is meant,
as, for instance, the northwest, or the state, no fault could be found with such
a rule. But in these days the physician or surgeon in a village like Cloquet is
not hampered by lack of opportunity for advancement. Frequent meetings of
medical societies, articles in the medical journals, books by acknowledged authorities, and extensive experience in hospital work put the country doctor on more
equal terms with his city brother. He would probably resent an imputation that
he possessed less skill than the average physician or surgeon in the large cities,
and we are unwilling to hold that he is to be judged only by the qualifications
that others in the same village or similar villages possess. 9
This decision came at a time when a small minority of courts, at best,
were even entertaining thoughts of modifying the "locality" rule. Perhaps
this fact accounts for subsequent decisions by the same supreme court; decisions which show a retreat back to the old standard. 10
Despite Minnesota's refusal to follow the reasoning behind the Viita decision, a trend towards discarding this restrictive measure of skill has developed. Melvin Belli acknowledges this in his book, Modern Trials, where
he states:
In some jurisdictions, the healer is only held to the standards of his own particular
locality. Other state courts subject him to a somewhat higher standard, that of
physicians of similar communities. Still other courts have held that the locality
is only one of the circumstances to consider in finding whether the doctor has
8 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).

9 Id. at 136, 137, 155 N.W. at 1081.
10 Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210, 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967) ; Manion
v. Tweedy, 257 Minn. 59, 100 N.W.2d 124 (1959); Johnson v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 300
N.W. 791 (1941); Williamson v. Andrews, 198 Minn. 349, 270 N.W. 6 (1936); Yates v.
Gamble et al, 198 Minn. 7,268 N.W. 670 (1936).
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exercised reasonable care. . . Some courts of some jurisdictions, in keeping
with the growing uniformity of medical education and technical facilities, show
a marked tendency to expand the geographical limitations."
Dean Prosser, in his treatise on the law of torts, reaches a similar conclusion.
He finds the present tendency to be one which abandons any "locality"
rule formula, and treats the locality as merely one factor to be considered
12
in applying the general professional standard.
Of the states, other than Massachusetts and Minnesota, which have dealt
with the "locality" rule problem, the most recently reported cases show that
thirty-three have yet to announce any noteworthy changes in their thinking.
Nineteen hold that a doctor is to be held to that degree of proficiency possessed by the average doctor in his locality. 18 These states espouse the "same
locality" rule-the healer is judged by those standards of his local colleagues
alone. While this rule seems more strict than the "same or similar localities"
rule, the courts following the former have qualified it by including the words
"general neighborhood" or "general community," and, thus, there is at best
a fine line between the two. A smaller number of states (fourteen) follow
14
the "same or similar localities" rule.
11 MELVIN BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 731 (1963).

12 PROSSa, THE LAW or TORTS, § 32, at 166-167 (3d ed. 1963). See McCoid, supra note
6, at 571, 575.
13Alabama, Watterson v. Conwell, 258 Ala. 180, 61 So. 2d 690 (1952); Arizona,
Harris v. Campbell, 2 Ariz. App. 351, 409 P.2d 67 (1965) ; Colorado, Foose v. Haymood,
135 Col. 278, 310 P.2d 722 (1957) ; Illinois, Mann v. Sanders, 29 Ill. App. 2d 291, 173
N.E.2d 12 (1961); Indiana, Shirley v. Schlemmer, 230 N.E.2d 534 (1967); Louisiana,
Langston v. St. Charles Hospital, 202 So. 2d 386 (1967); Maryland, Solomon v. Fishel,
228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1961); Mississippi, DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190,
164 So.2d 762 (1964); Montana, Donathan v. McConnel, 121 Mont. 230, 193 P.2d 819
(1948); Nebraska, In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944); New
Mexico, Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); New York, Calhoun v.
Gale, 287 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1968); Oklahoma, Eckels v. Traverse, 362 P.2d 680 (Okla.
1961); South Dakota, Hausen v. Isaak, 70 S.D. 529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945); Texas, Rose
v. Friddell, 423 S.W.2d 658 (1967); Utah, Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423
P.2d 663 (1967) ; Vermont, Pepin v. Averill, 113 Vt. 212, 32 A.2d 665 (1943) ; Virginia,
Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 156 S.E.2d 787 (1967); Wyoming, Govin v. Hunter,
374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962). The District of Columbia is in accord, Staples v. Washington,
125 A.2d 322 (1956).
14Arkansas, Walls v. Boyett, 216 Ark. 541, 226 S.W.2d 552 (1950); Connecticut,
Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Delaware, Di Filippo v. Preston,
53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961) ; Kansas, Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955
(1961); Kentucky, Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); Michigan, Bradshaw
v. Blaine, 1 Mich. App. 50, 134 N.W.2d 386 (1965); Missouri, Hart v. Steele, 416 S.W.2d
927 (Mo. 1967); New Hampshire, Carrigan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 N.H. 73,
178 A.2d 502 (1962); North Carolina, Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548
(1968); Ohio, Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964); Oregon,
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation Northern Hospitals, 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961) ;
Rhode Island, Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d, 669 (1956) ; Tennessee, Methodist
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A few states have pursued the expansion of the standard by allowing
the testimony of expert witnesses who are not of the same or a similar community. California did this in 1949 in the case of Sinz v. Owens.1 5 There the
court observed:
The more recent California cases upon the question of competency of a doctor in
one community to testify as to the standard of care at another place, although
phrasing the rule in terms of 'same' or 'similar' locality, have shown a clear
tendency to depart from the earlier geographical limitations of the rule...
The essential factor is knowledge of similarity of conditions; geographical proximity
is only one factor to be considered.' 6
That the locality is a factor to be considered does not lessen the effect of
the decision reached by this court; the locality must be considered, just as
all other circumstances which have a bearing on the case. Thus, the fact that
the doctor does not practice in the same or a similar community is no longer
significant in relation to whether or not he will be allowed to testify-his
degree of expertise is the vital factor to be considered by the court. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the same policy concerning
expert testimony in Hundley v. Martinez,17 emphasizing that expert witnesses
are the only ones who can prove negligence or want of professional skill in
medical malpractice cases. Georgia and Florida have also reached the same
8
conclusion.'
Another approach utilized to modify the rule has been to extend the
geographical boundaries. This has been accomplished in three states. 19 The
reasoning behind the change effected by these states was well expressed by
the Idaho court:
The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as they exist, and
not by what they have been in the past or may be in the future. Today, with the
rapid methods of transportation and easy means of communication, the horizons
have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing
the means at hand in the particular village where he is practicing. So far as
Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961); Wisconsin, McManus v.
Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964).

15 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
16 Sinz v. Owens, supra note 15, at 756, 757, 205 P.2d at 7.
17 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
18
Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Montgomery v. Stary,
84 So. 2d 34 (Fla., 1955). Three Chicago doctors were permitted to testify as to the
standard of care, over objections of appellant that they were familiar neither with the
same locality nor similar localities.

19 Idaho, Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941) ; North
Dakota, Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940); Pennsylvania, Hodgson v.
Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939).
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medical treatment is concerned, the borders of the locality and community have,
in effect, been extended so as to include those centers readily accessible where
the appropriate treatment may be had which the local physician, because of
limited facilities or training is unable to give.2°
These states have recognized that the physician practicing in a small town
is no longer isolated from the many advances in the medical profession. The
latest in sophisticated equipment is as readily accessible to him as it is to
his counterpart in the large city. While these states have not expressly
abandoned the "locality" rule, they are on the brink of doing so. As they
broaden the bounds within which the standard of skill is determined, they
necessarily extend the ambits of prior case law.
The states of Maine and Iowa have not announced that the old standard
is no more, yet the decisions in Josselyn v. Dearborn2 ' and McGulpin v.
Bessmer,22 respectively, are food for thought along that line. In the Josselyn
case, the high court of Maine upheld the refusal of the presiding justice
to instruct that the locality was important in determining the degree of skill
and care required. The court held that the justice's instruction that the
physician is held to that degree of care and skill ordinarily possessed by
other physicians under like conditions was sufficient, and that from this the
jury would consider the locality as one of the circumstances to be properly
taken into account. The court in McGulpin said:
There seems to be sound basis for holding a physician to such reasonable care
and skill as is exercised by the ordinary physician of good standing under like
is merely one circumstance, not an
circumstances. And the locality in question
28
absolute limit upon the skill required. 3
These states are but one step away from a complete abandonment of the
"locality" rule. Their language is extremely similar to the Brune decision,
as well as the two cases which will be discussed below.
Aside from Massachusetts, two other states have done away with the
"locality" rule. In the case of Pederson v. Dumouchel24 the Supreme Court of
Washington, foreshadowing the Brune decision, found that "[t]he 'locality
rule' has no present-day vitality except that it may be considered as one
of the elements to determine the degree of care and skill which is to be
expected of the average practitioner of the class to which he belongs ...
20
21

Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., supra note 19, at 238, 118 P.2d at 714, 715.
143 Me. Rep. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948).

22 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
23

McGulpin v. Bessmer, supra note 22, at 1131, 43 N.W.2d at 128.

24 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967). Accord, Versteeg v. Mowery, 435 P.2d
540 (1967).
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In other words, local practice within geographic proximity is one, but not
the only factor to be considered." 25 The state of New Jersey has reached
26
the same conclusion.
When the 'locality' rule was originally applied, it might well have been
apropos. The courts felt it unfair to impose liability on a doctor on the
basis of a comparison of his expertise with that possessed by others in different parts of our country, or even in other sections of the defendant's own
state or county. From the time that this standard first appeared there have
been significant changes in our population pattern, particularly, the shift
from rural to urban areas. There has been a marked increase in the quality
of our transportation. With the significant advances in the communications
media, radio, television, and the printing industry, news of improvement in
the medical profession is available to any doctor in the country. In addition
to these advances, the quality of medical education has vastly improved.
In 1906 there were 162 medical schools in the United States. Nearly all
of them were scantily equipped, had no hospitals, and few, if any, had
expert teachers. The course of education then, was two annual sessions of
six months each, with the general requirement for admission to school being
a high school education. Realizing that improvements in the training of
doctors were desperately needed, committees were formed which investigated
the schools. In 1910 a comprehensive study was published which classed
the schools according to degree of excellence as either A, B, or C. With this
publication many of the schools, out of embarrassment or disgrace, were
forced to either terminate activities or merge with a class A school. In 1923
there were only 80 medical schools, and these were far advanced from any of
those of 1906.27 The size of medical endowments had increased, new buildings
and better laboratories were constructed, and better trained teachers, with
more efficient methods of instruction, were attracted.
In the academic year 1966-1967 there were 89 medical schools in active
operation, all of whose course of education runs four years. Of these, 87 were
fully accredited,2 8 with the remaining two being classed as schools in develop25

Pederson v. Dumouchel, supra note 24, at 78, 431 P.2d at 978.

Fernandez v. Baruch, 96 N.J. Super. 125, 232 A.2d 661 (1967). The high court
said, "It is incumbent upon the treating physician to utilize only that degree of care,
knowledge, and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised in similar situatons by the
average member of the practicing profession in that field." Id. at 135, 232 A.2d at 666.
Accord, Schueler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330, 204 A.2d 577 (1964).
27 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 177-178 (1944). See also, A. FLEXNIR, UNIvERsrrris,
26

AMERICAN, ENGLISn, GERMAN 85-96 (1930).
28 The standards of accreditation are set by the Liaison Committee on Medical Educa-

tion, composed of the Council on Medical Education and the Association of American
Medical Colleges. This committee also does the actual accrediting of United States medical schools.
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ment. 29 In contrast to the requirement of a high school education for entrance
in the beginning of this century, today all medical students are college
graduates. The great majority of them demonstrated superior academic skill
while in college. A recent survey found it to be the consensus among college
deans and admission committees that the quality and background training
of medical applicants is definitely on the increase.8 0
In line with this self-policing within the profession, the states have
"toughened up" their requirements for obtaining a license to practice medicine. All states require that the graduate of a recognized medical school
pass a comprehensive written exam. Twenty-three require a Basic Science
Certificate, and 41 require an endorsement from the National Board. In
addition to these, 39 state examining boards require some form of internship,
with 35 of them making an internship period of at least one year mandatory. 31
With the four years of medical school, internship, residency, and successful
completion of all state licensing requirements taken care of, many doctors
continue their medical education. The number of those who do is increasing,
82
as is the amount of courses offered in advanced learning.
In view of these noteworthy advances it is hardly proper that an outdated,
provincial standard of skill should be applied in order to determine liability,
or the lack of it.3 3 The quality of medical aid is more uniform throughout
the country; the factors used to measure this quality should also be uniform.
While the majority of our states have not changed their "locality" rule thinking, the number of those which have is significant, and their reasoning is
cogent. The trend towards abandonment of the old standard is here, and will
continue to grow. The future of the "locality" rule is not a bright one, and
eventually this ancient doctrine will likely be abandoned. This is merely
keeping pace with our modern, changing society, and the advantages inherent
in this speak for themselves.
Raymond Smerge
29

Medical Education in the United States, 202 J.A.M.A. 725, 729 (1967).

80 Id.at 753, 754.
81 COUNCIL ON MEDICAL

EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL

LICENSURE STATISTICS FOR 1967, at 1079, 1080.

82 Supra note 29, at 793.
33 For a general discussion as to criticism of the "locality" rule, see Note, 60 Nw. U.L.

REV. 834, 837-839 (1966); Note, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884 (1962); Comment, 36 MARO. L.
REV. 392 (1953); Note, 36 IowA L. REV. 681, 688-693 (1951); Note, 35 MIN. L. REV.
186 (1951).

